‘October’ brings no good news.

On October 11, 2026, Governor’s Rule and a state of emergency were once again imposed in KP, and thus an elected government was dissolved—an event that is, in any case, nothing new for the province. The question remains, however: how could an unelected, undemocratic government succeed in eliminating the terrorism and extremism that could not be eradicated even during General Musharraf’s military regime?

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf has been in power in this province for the third consecutive term since 2013, yet it is now facing accusations of facilitating the Taliban. The question is simple: how did this war begin, who provided the backing, and will we ever be able to break free from it? It is often popular figures who make ‘unpopular’ decisions. In any case, this period of emergency appears to be a prolonged one; our history seems to be moving backward rather than forward—yet, as Faiz Sahib said…

The evening of sorrow is long, yet it is but an evening.

As for the issue of terrorism and the “Taliban factor,” it is a fact that this turmoil did not arise from the outside but from within—the trouble emerged from right here in the city, from our own offices. I once asked the late Roedad ​​Khan—a highly controversial bureaucrat of his time—what his first assignment was upon joining the civil service. He replied, “I was one of the twenty-four civil servants who joined the Civil Service of Pakistan in 1949—twelve from East Pakistan and twelve from West Pakistan.”

“I was first sent to the Frontier Province (the former name of KP) to carry out a crackdown against the Red Shirt movement and the Communists—a group that included both politicians and journalists. As a result of this crackdown, many political activists and leaders either went underground or fled to Afghanistan.”

Suffice it to say that this marked the beginning of the end for left-wing ideological politics in KP. Roedad ​​Khan observes, “The state had become alarmed by the rising popularity of the Left—both within and outside the Muslim League, and particularly in Bengal; this was perhaps a major reason behind the imposition of martial law in 1958. The National Awami Party was gaining traction in KP, Balochistan, and Sindh, so the decision to implement ‘One Unit’ was also part of this same chain of events.” In the 1970s, the United States was alarmed by the wave of left-wing movements—such as the Communist Party of India challenging the Congress in India, the Tudeh Party in Iran, and the NAP alliance in Pakistan.

To counter this momentum, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto raised the slogan of “Islamic Socialism,” while—under pressure from the Shah of Iran—a charade was staged regarding the alleged presence of “arms” at the Iraqi embassy; subsequently, an elected government in Balochistan was dismissed, effectively pushing the NAP and Baloch political forces into a corner. This marked the beginning of the crisis, a manifestation of which we are witnessing in the province today. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the elected NAP and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam government resigned in protest.

On the surface, the dismissal of the Balochistan government was justified by invoking provisions of the 1973 Constitution—much like how a state of emergency was declared and fundamental human rights were suspended immediately after that Constitution’s ratification. While we have witnessed the imposition of “martial law” in Karachi, Hyderabad, and Lahore during civilian tenures to crush the 1977 movement, the current situation has—thankfully—not escalated beyond a “state of emergency”; there has been no repeat of the events of October 12. Through such measures, our civilian governments essentially manufacture a pretext for undemocratic actions by taking refuge in the Constitution itself. As the poet said, “The lamps of all shall be extinguished; the wind belongs to no one”—and that is precisely what came to pass, On July 5, 1977, an indefinite period of martial law was imposed, sparking a historic struggle; yet, prior to this, the elected Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was executed. Furthermore, General Zia attempted to mobilize opposition against Bhutto and the PPP by releasing NAP leaders who had been imprisoned during Bhutto’s tenure, while simultaneously seeking the support of the Pakistan National Alliance—and the parties and leaders championing the “Nizam-e-Mustafa” (System of the Prophet) slogan—based on the promise to hold elections within 90 days.

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However, these groups soon realized that Zia was using them—right up until Bhutto’s execution. Pakistan’s importance to the United States grew even further due to the unfolding changes in Iran and Afghanistan: the need to contain the Iranian Islamic Revolution on one hand, and to halt the spread of the communist revolution following the Soviet entry into Afghanistan on the other. For this entire undertaking, following the closure of the US Embassy in Tehran, the US Embassy in Islamabad effectively became the CIA’s regional headquarters; and who better than General Zia to spearhead the ‘Afghan Jihad’?

This marked the beginning of efforts to curb leftist trends in provinces like KP and Balochistan—as well as elsewhere—by enlisting the support of right-wing and certain religious parties, although the primary target was the PPP. Meanwhile, in Punjab, right-wing politics was promoted through Mian Nawaz Sharif, as religious parties were failing to garner support and the JUI had refused to abandon the democratic path. They supported the Afghan Jihad yet also advocated for ending the country’s dictatorship, thereby remaining part of the democratic movement. General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, General Hamid Gul, and the PPP’s General Naseerullah Babar are among the figures identified as the “behind-the-scenes” architects of the “Taliban factor.”

In an interview, General Hamid Gul once told me, “Muhammad Khan Junejo’s government fell because of the Geneva Accords, and later, I personally made it clear to Mohtarma Benazir what our Afghanistan policy would be.” The late Hamid Gul wanted Imran Khan to pursue this same path later on. Thus, we pushed this country toward extremism, and today we are paying the price for it. The wave of terrorism that emerged before and after 9/11 has now spread through our society like a cancer in the form of extremism. Imran has harbored a soft spot for the Taliban regarding Afghanistan from day one—both when the state supported the Taliban and now, when our policy is opposed to them.

The question now arises: Imran was an individual—popular as a cricketing hero—but who brought him into politics and who backed him? Now that he is immensely popular and the Tehreek-e-Insaf has become the largest party—winning in KP since 2013—figures like Ali Amin or Sohail Afridi will naturally fight ‘terrorism’ in their own way and oppose military operations. Whether it was the ‘Red Shirts’ (Surkh Posh), the NAP, or the ANP that were dismantled, this same ‘factor’ inevitably emerges—be it under Nawaz Sharif, Asif Zardari, or anyone else. It is a long debate; one should simply learn from history. Even if an undemocratic attitude is technically constitutional, it remains undemocratic nonetheless.